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Abstract. Following a coma, some patients may “awaken” without voluntary interaction or communication with the environment.
More than 40 years ago this condition was coined coma vigil or apallic syndrome and later became worldwide known as
“persistent vegetative state”. About 10 years ago it became clear that some of these patients who failed to recover verbal or
non-verbal communication did show some degree of consciousness – a condition called “minimally conscious state”. Some
authors questioned the usefulness of differentiating unresponsive “vegetative” from minimally conscious patients but subsequent
functional neuroimaging studies have since objectively demonstrated differences in residual cerebral processing and hence, we
think, conscious awareness. These neuroimaging studies have also demonstrated that a small subset of unresponsive “vegetative”
patients may show unambiguous signs of consciousness and command following inaccessible to bedside clinical examination.
These findings, together with negative associations intrinsic to the term “vegetative state” as well as the diagnostic errors and
their potential effect on the treatment and care for these patients gave rise to the recent proposal for an alternative neutral and
more descriptive name: unresponsive wakefulness syndrome. We here give an overview of PET and (functional) MRI studies
performed in these challenging patients and stress the need for a separate ICD-9-CM diagnosis code and MEDLINE MeSH entry
for “minimally conscious state” as the lack of clear distinction between vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and
minimally conscious state may encumber scientific studies in the field of disorders of consciousness.
Keywords: Consciousness, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, minimally conscious state, functional MRI,
positron emission tomography
1. Introduction
Since the invention of the artificial respirator in the
1950s by Bjorn Ibsen in Denmark, many patients who
previously did not survive their brain damage and coma
now could be artificially ventilated and had their cardiac
circulation sustained. This lead to the redefinition of
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death based on neurological criteria (i.e., brain death)
and the notion of therapeutic obstinacy (i.e., the contin-
uation or start of treatment in the absence of any hope
of recovery). It also leads to an increased incidence
of patients “awakening” from the acute coma while re-
maining without any sign of voluntary interaction with
the environment. Some days to weeks after the acute
brain insult (often also after a period of sedation or
anesthesia/pharmacological coma) these patients clas-
sically open the eyes, start to breath unaided and show
spontaneous or stimulus-induced “reflex” or “automat-
ic” movements. This condition was initially named
apallic syndrome [46] or coma vigil [21] and in 1972
was coined “persistent vegetative state (PVS)” [43] a
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term now also called “unresponsive wakefulness syn-
drome” (UWS) [55]. We here discuss the diagnos-
tic challenges encountered in patients with disorders
of consciousness (DOC) and the lessons learned from
positron emission tomography (PET) and magnetic res-
onance imaging (MRI) studies in “resting state”, pas-
sive sensory stimulation and active “command follow-
ing” and “communication” paradigms.
2. A rose by any other name would smell as sweet
The name vegetative state (VS) was chosen to refer
to the preserved vegetative nervous functioning, mean-
ing these patients have (variably) preserved sleep-wake
cycles, respiration, digestion or thermoregulation. The
term “persistent” was added to denote that the condition
remained for at least one month after insult. In 1994,
the Multi-Society Task Force on PVS defined the tem-
poral criteria for irreversibility (that is, more than one
year for traumatic and three months for non-traumatic
(anoxic) etiology) and introduced the notion of perma-
nent vegetative state [102]. It is to these latter cases that
often ethical and legal end-of-life issues, of withhold-
ing and withdrawal of life sustaining treatment (that is,
artificial hydration and nutrition), are related [23,42].
Unfortunately the abbreviation for Persistent Vegeta-
tive State (i.e., PVS) is time and again confounded with
the abbreviation for Permanent Vegetative State [49,
56]. In line with the recommendations of the American
Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine [1], we prefer to
avoid the use of the terms “persistent” and “permanent”
in favor of simply specifying the etiology and length of
time patients spent in a vegetative/unresponsive condi-
tion.
Very recently the European Task Force on Disorders
of Consciousness has proposed a more descriptive and
neutral term for VS: “Unresponsive Wakefulness Syn-
drome” (UWS) [55]. “Unresponsive” was chosen to il-
lustrate that these patients only show reflex movements
without response to commands. “Wakefulness” refers
to the presence of eye opening – spontaneous or stimu-
lation induced – never observed in coma. “Syndrome”
stresses that we are assessing a series of clinical signs.
Indeed, consciousness is a subjective first person ex-
perience and its clinical evaluation is based on the as-
sessment of motor responsiveness. Table 1 shows a list
of translations for “unresponsiveness” or UWS permit-
ting medical caregivers an alternative name for “vege-
tative”. The reason for changing the name was main-
ly justified by the intrinsic negative connotation of the
Table 1
Translations of unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS), the re-
cently proposed alternative name for “vegetative state” (VS) [55]
Language Proposed term
English unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
French syndrome d’e´veil non re´pondant
Dutch niet responsief waaksyndroom
German syndrom des nicht-responsiven wachzustandes
Spanish sı´ndrome de vigilia sin respuesta
Italian sindrome di vigilanza non responsiva
Greek σνδρoµo µη αpioκρσιµης εγργoρσης




word “vegetative” (unintentionally comparing patients
to vegetables) but also by the problems of quantifying
consciousness at the bedside (as illustrated by clinical
studies assessing possible misdiagnosis) and by neu-
roimaging studies showing in some (very) rare patients
residual cognition inaccessible to behavioral examina-
tion. How difficult is it to make the clinical diagnosis
of VS/UWS?
3. Making the bedside diagnosis
Clinical studies conducted in the early 1990s have
illustrated how challenging it can be to disentangle re-
flex behavior (characteristic of vegetative/unresponsive
patients) from intermittent voluntary behavior (charac-
teristic of minimally conscious patients) – a problem
that can potentially lead to diagnostic error in up to
40% of patients [3,24]. A recent study by Schnakers
et al has demonstrated that despite the publication of
numerous clinical guidelines on the diagnostic criteria
of VS [4,85,103], and despite the publication of diag-
nostic criteria for MCS [36], these high rates of diag-
nostic error seemingly remain unchanged when the di-
agnosis is based on unstructured neurological assess-
ment [96]. In our view, the lessons to learn from these
studies on “misdiagnosis” of VS/UWS illustrate the
need for standardized “consciousness-scales”. It has
indeed been shown that the use of validated scales such
as the Coma Recovery Scale – Revised (CRS-R) [38]
or the Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabilita-
tion Technique (SMART) [39] permit to identify small,
fluctuating and often easily exhaustible motor signs of
conscious awareness that can be missed by unstruc-
tured clinical assessment [96], or by using acute “co-
ma scales” such as the Glasgow Coma Scale [93] – for
review see [2].
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Scales like the CRS-R [38] and SMART [39] of-
fer the advantage to systematically search for signs of
non-reflex behavior (e.g., visual pursuit or oriented re-
sponse to noxious stimulation) and command follow-
ing in a well-defined manner. Visual pursuit, for ex-
ample, should be assessed by using a moving mirror,
as it has been shown that a substantial number of pa-
tients will not show eye tracking of a moving object or
person, but will do so when using an auto-referential
stimulus such as the own face [109]. Conversely, signs
such as visual blinking to threat [107] and visual fixa-
tion [20] were recently shown not to necessarily reflect
conscious awareness and could hence be compatible
with the diagnosis of VS/UWS. Finally, the absence
of (behavioral) proof of consciousness is not absolute
proof of absence of consciousness [70]. It is impor-
tant that the evaluations are repeated over time and per-
formed by trained experienced assessors. Confounding
factors such as drugs with sedative side effects (e.g.,
against spasticity or epilepsy) or the presence of infec-
tion or other medical complications should be account-
ed for. This situation is even more problematical when
patients have underlying deficits with communication
functions, such as aphasia, agnosia or apraxia [18,69].
Hence, some behaviorally unresponsive patients could,
despite the best clinical assessment, be underestimat-
ed in terms of residual cognition or conscious aware-
ness [52]. Since the venue of functional neuroimag-
ing, this challenging issue can be addressed by direct-
ly measuring brain activity at rest and during senso-
ry stimulation in these patients (for review see [54,88,
105]).
4. Measuring the brain “at rest”
Historically, the first reliable studies employed
positron emission tomography (PET) quantifying the
brain’s metabolism in resting conditions by use of
18fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG). These early studies
needed more invasive methods (repeated arterial blood
sampling) to calculate cerebral metabolic rates for glu-
cose metabolism (expressed in mg of glucose use per
100 gr of brain tissue per minute). As summarized
in Table 2A, they showed a global and massive de-
crease in brain activity in VS/UWS [28,61,67,86,104].
However, the reported decrease in global cortical brain
metabolism showed some variability with reductions
ranging from 25 to 72% of normal values (obtained in
healthy waking volunteers). The advent of more so-
phisticated and data-driven (i.e., voxel-based) statisti-
cal analytical tools next permitted to recognize not on-
ly global changes in brain function but more detailed
regional differences in metabolic activity distinctive of
VS/UWS.
Early voxel-based comparisons [61,62,68] between
patients (i.e., wakeful “unawareness”) and age-matched
healthy controls (i.e., wakeful awareness) demonstrat-
ed that VS/UWS patients systematically showed a
metabolic dysfunction in a widespread fronto-parietal
network encompassing midline (i.e., anterior cingu-
late/mesiofrontal and posterior cingulate/precuneus)
and lateral (i.e., prefrontal and posterior parietal) asso-
ciative cortices. As was expected, the relatively pre-
served areas were confined to subcortical, midbrain
and brainstem structures known to be involved in au-
tonomous functions such as sleep-wake cycles, ther-
moregulation and respiration [50]. Recent studies by
our and other groups have confirmed these results [10,
20,44,75,98]. These observations made us postulate
that consciousness should not be seen as an emergent
property of whole brain function but rather critically de-
pends on the functional integrity of a neuroanatomically
widespread but well-defined frontoparietal network [5,
48]. Subsequent functional neuroimaging studies on
conscious perception in healthy volunteers [29,83] as
well as data obtained in sleep (for review see [71])
and general anesthesia (for review see [17]) have con-
firmed this “frontoparietal workspace” hypothesis of
consciousness. User-independent “consciousness clas-
sifiers” [80] can now use patients’ FDG-PET brain
scans, automatically assess the functional integrity in
the frontoparietal network and calculate a probability
of being VS/UWS or conscious but “locked-in” – illus-
trating the translation of scientific knowledge from the
bench to the bedside.
Within this frontoparietal “awareness network” the
precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex seems to be a
“critical hub” [110,111]. Indeed, this area is the most
active in conscious resting conditions [82] and seems
the most impaired in altered states of conscious-
ness, differentiating VS/UWS from MCS (for review
see [66]). Importantly, recovery from VS/UWS seems
to be paralleled by the restoration of metabolic activi-
ty in the precuneus/posterior cingulate region [53,62].
Similarly, late recovery from MCS was paralleled by
axonal regrowth in this region as measured by MRI
diffusion tensor imaging [112]. However, we should
not make the mistake to reduce a cognitive function
to a brain area or network. In addition to the (neo-
phrenological) concept of cerebral functional segrega-
tion we stress the importance of functional integration
or connectivity.
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Table 2
“Resting state” brain function as measured by (A) positron emission tomography (PET) 18fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) and (B) functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) in disorders of consciousness
Reference N Diagnosis Etiology Duration Main findings
A. PET
Levy et al., 1987 [67] 7 VS/UWS TBI/NTBI 1–72 m 60% (53–67%) decrease in metabolism
De Volder et al., 1990 [28] 7 VS/UWS NTBI 1–4 m 53% (43–65%) decrease in metabolism
Tommasino et al., 1995 [104] 10 VS/UWS TBI/NTBI 2–24 m 56% decrease in metabolism
Rudolf et al., 1999 [86] 24 VS/UWS NTBI < 1 m–6 m 25% decrease in metabolism (17% < 3 m and 33% >
3 m)
Laureys et al., 1999 [62] 1 VS/UWS NTBI 1 m 38% decrease in metabolism; recovery of consciousness
= FP recovery
Laureys et al., 1999 [61] 4 VS/UWS TBI/ NTBI < 1 m–60 m FP hypometabolism & disconnections
Laureys et al., 2000 [59] 1 VS/UWS NTBI 4 m recovery of consciousness = thalamocortical reconnec-
tions
Rudolf et al., 2000 [87] 9 VS/UWS NTBI < 1 m decrease in benzodiazepine receptor density
Laureys et al., 2002 [50] 30 VS/UWS TBI/ NTBI 1–5 m 56% (37–72%) decrease in metabolism
Beuthien-Baumann, 2003 [10] 16 VS/UWS TBI 2–12 m 58% decrease in metabolism; FP hypometabolism
Tengvar, 2004 [101] 1 MCS NTBI 6 m 47–65% FP hypometabolism
Juengling et al., 2005 [44] 5 VS/UWS NTBI 1–48 m FP and thalamus hypometabolism
Nakayama et al., 2006 [75] 30 17 VS/UWS TBI 6–60 m FP and thalamus hypometabolism in VS/UWS, less
13 MCS impaired in MCS
Silva et al., 2010 [98] 10 VS/UWS TBI/ NTBI 2–24 m FP hypometabolism
Lull et al., 2010 [68] 17 VS/UWS TBI 12 m thalamus hypometabolism
& MCS
Bruno et al., 2010 [20] 10 VS/UWS NTBI 3 m FP hypometabolism (VS/UWS without fixation =
“MCS” with fixation)
B. fMRI
Boly et al., 2009 [16] 1 VS/UWS NTBI 36 m FP disconnections
Cauda et al., 2009 [22] 3 VS/UWS TBI/NTBI 20 m FP disconnections
Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009 [108] 13 4 VS/UWS TBI/NTBI < 1− 60 m FP disconnections correlate with consciousness level
& 5 coma
4 MCS
Note. N = Number of patients; VS/UWS = vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome; MCS = minimally conscious state; FP =
frontoparietal associative network; TBI = traumatic brain injury; NTBI = non traumatic brain injury; m = months.
Functional connectivity PET studies (acquired at rest
and during external auditory and somatosensory stim-
ulation) made us propose to consider VS/UWS as a
cortico-cortical [57,60,61] and thalamo-cortical [58,
59] disconnection syndrome. The study of VS/UWS
patients who subsequently recovered offered an addi-
tional causal link between consciousness and the func-
tional integrity of this frontoparietal network and its
long-range cortico-thalamo-cortical connectivity – es-
pecially its non-specific (central intralaminar) thalamic
projections [59]. The critical role of these diffusely
projecting thalamic nuclei in consciousness was cor-
roborated by Schiff et al. [89] deep-brain stimulation
study in MCS.
Only recently it became possible to measure “rest-
ing state” brain activity by means of non-ionizing func-
tional MRI (fMRI). In contrast to FDG-PET where one
image is obtained representing the average metabol-
ic activity of approximately 30 minutes, fMRI rest-
ing state acquisitions offer a series of scans (i.e., a
time series) classically obtained during about 10 min-
utes representing a more indirect measurement of neu-
ral function (i.e., assessing hemodynamic changes).
These fMRI data obtained at “rest” (that is without
any stimulation in contrast to classical fMRI activa-
tion studies discussed below) permit to extract (us-
ing a multitude of novel and methodologically com-
plicated preprocessing and analyses tools) [99] the so-
called “default mode network” activity [15]. This “de-
fault mode network”, encompassing midline cortices
(i.e., anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal and posterior cin-
gulate/precuneus) is thought to reflect internal or self-
awareness (i.e., spontaneous thoughts, inner speech and
mind wandering) [64,99,106]. Resting state fMRI stud-
ies have shown that this network disappears in brain
death [16] and decreases in VS/UWS [16,22,108] (Ta-
ble 2B). MCS patients showed an intermediate pattern
with a higher functional connectivity of the posterior
cingulate/precuneus area as compared to unresponsive
patients [108] – confirming the above-discussed FDG-
PET results. Interestingly, the authors also showed
a linear correlation between behavioral CRS-R total
scores and “default mode network” connectivity.
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5. “Activation” studies using sensory stimulation
In the late 1990s functional neuroimaging activation
studies used 15O labeled water PET measuring region-
al increases in cerebral blood flow in response to pas-
sive external (auditory, somatosensory or visual) stim-
ulation. Table 3A summarizes these studies, showing
that for most VS/UWS patients a “low level” cortical
activation was reported encompassing primary audito-
ry [13,57,78,90], somatosensory [14,60] or visual [37,
72] cortices. These results showed that sensory stimu-
lation in VS/UWS induced not only subcortical neural
activation but also robustly activated gray matter re-
gions [45]. Functional connectivity studies, however,
showed that these cortical activations existed like an is-
land isolated from the frontoparietal network discussed
above, thought to be necessary for the emergence of
conscious perception [11].
The preservation of isolated “low-level” cortical
activation to passive sensory stimulation has lately
been corroborated by fMRI [9,26,34,41,84](Table 3B).
Moreover, these studies are also showing the poten-
tial prognostic value of the technique [25,31]. Indeed,
VS/UWS with absent or low-level brain activation (i.e.,
the majority of the studied cases) have lower chances of
subsequent recovery as compared to those with higher-
level activation (i.e., activation extending to associa-
tive multimodal cortices). The latter pattern of activa-
tion is often (albeit not always) encountered in MCS
patients [113]. Connectivity studies showed not on-
ly a higher level of functional segregation (i.e., more
widespread activation) in MCS but also of functional
integration (i.e., more functional long range cortico-
cortical connectivity with the frontoparietal “aware-
ness” network) as compared to VS/UWS for both audi-
tory [13] and noxious processing [14]. The latter study,
showing good evidence of residual pain perception in
MCS has obvious clinical consequences.
As for consciousness, pain is a first person subjec-
tive experience that cannot be reduced to activity in
a single brain region but involves the so-called “pain
matrix” [97]. The observed activation of the whole
of the pain matrix in MCS [14], including the anterior
cingulate and insular areas thought to be important in
the affective emotional perception of pain [47] should
prompt physicians to systematically use pain killers in
MCS, even if (by definition) they cannot communicate
their sensations [30]. A recently proposed “pain scale”
specifically developed for use in DOC now permits to
monitor and adapt the level of nociception/pain and
analgesia treatment [92]. This Nociception Coma Scale
proposes that when the total score (based on assessment
of motor, verbal, visual and facial responses) is above
7 out of 12, treatment should be started or continued.
Functional neuroimaging studies have also aimed
to address the question whether DOC patients per-
ceive emotions. A series of studies have illustrat-
ed that intense or emotionally relevant stimuli in-
duce higher-level activation in MCS (for review [52]).
In the auditory modality, these studies have used
presentation of meaningful stories told by a rela-
tive [7,91] or auto-referential stimuli such as the
patient’s own name [32,65,81]. The latter studies,
for example, show activation of midline structures
(i.e., anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal and posterior cin-
gulate/precuneus) [65,81] known to be involved in
self-consciousness [64]. However, it should again be
stressed that activation of a brain area (or network) per
se does not consist an absolute proof of consciousness
but could be considered as “automatic” processing.
6. Proving consciousness without movement
In addition to the above reviewed “resting state” and
“passive stimulation” functional neuroimaging studies,
recent fMRI paradigms aimed at showing proof of com-
mand following in the scanner. Mental imagery tasks
(such as imagine playing tennis) will activate specific
brain areas (premotor cortex for motor imagery) that
can easily be picked-up by block-design fMRI [12].
When a behaviorally unresponsive patient repeatedly
shows robust activation of premotor cortex if and on-
ly if she or he is requested to do the mental imagery
task, this constitutes objective evidence that the patient
understood and obeyed the command and hence must
be conscious. In 2006, this approach first illustrated its
potential to show fMRI signs of consciousness unavail-
able to clinical assessment [76]. The technique was
soon adapted to electroencephalography based event re-
lated potential (ERP) paradigms and have since proven
their utility in clinical routine. In this ERP version of
the “imaging playing tennis” fMRI approach, patients
were asked to “count a name” leading to a P3 wave on
the EEG recording. In the reported series, 21% (3/14)
of patients showed ERP proof of command following
impossible to demonstrate during repeated behavioral
assessments [95]. The technique also permitted to iden-
tify a case of complete locked-in syndrome [94]. Sim-
ilar ERP [6] and electromyographic (EMG) [8] tech-
niques have since been developed showing respectively
20 or 17% of DOC patients demonstrating voluntary
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Table 3
Brain activation’s level in response to passive sensory stimulation as measured by (A) 15O labeled water PET and (B) fMRI in disorders of
consciousness
References Etiology Duration N Diagnostic Modality Level of
activation
A. PET
De Jong et al., 1997 [27] TBI 2 m 1 VS/UWS auditory (familiar voice) high
Menon et al., 1998 [72] NTBI 3 m 1 VS/UWS visual (familiar face) low
Schiff et al., 2002 [90] TBI/NTBI 6–300 m 5 3 VS/UWS auditory (click), tactile low
2 VS/UWS high
Owen et al., 2002 [78] TBI/NTBI 4 m 3 1 VS/UWS visual (familiar face), auditory (noise, words) low
2 VS/UWS high
Laureys et al., 2002 [60] TBI/NTBI 1 m 15 VS/UWS pain (electrical stimulation) low
Kassubek et al., 2003 [45] NTBI 3–48 m 7 VS/UWS pain (electrical stimulation) high
Boly et al., 2004 [13] TBI/NTBI 1–4 m 20 15 VS/UWS auditory (click) low
5 MCS high
Laureys et al., 2004 [65] NTBI 6 m 1 MCS auditory (noise, cries, own name) high
Owen et al., 2005 [77] NTBI 4 m 1 VS/UWS auditory (speech) high
Giacino et al., 2006 [37] TBI/NTBI 1–3 m 5 VS/UWS visual (flash) low
Boly et al., 2008 [14] 1–4 m 15 VS/UWS pain (electrical stimulation) low
5 MCS high
Silva et al., 2010 [98] TBI/NTBI 2–22 m 10 VS/UWS tactile low
B. fMRI
Moritz et al., 2001 [74] TBI < 1 m 1 VS/UWS tactile, visual (flash), auditory (speech) high
Bekinschtein et al., 2004 [7] TBI 5 m 1 MCS auditory (familiar voice) high
Bekinschtein et al., 2005 [9] TBI 2 m 1 VS/UWS auditory (words) low
Schiff et al., 2005 [91] TBI/NTBI 18 m 2 MCS auditory (speech), tactile high
Owen et al., 2006 [76] TBI 6 m 1 VS/UWS auditory (speech, ambiguity), visual high
Staffen et al., 2006 [100] NTBI 10 m 1 VS/UWS auditory (own name) high
Di et al., 2007 [32] TBI/NTBI 2–48 m 11 5 VS/UWS auditory (familiar voice own name ) low
2 VS/UWS high
4 MCS high





Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2008 [34] TBI 1–11 m 7 2 VS/UWS auditory (forward/backward speech) low
1 VS/UWS high
4 MCS low/high
Rousseau et al., 2008 [84] NTBI 60 m 4 VS tactile, visual and auditory low
Coleman et al., 2009 [25] TBI/NTBI 2–120 m 46 20 VS/UWS auditory (forward/backward speech, ambi- low
7 VS/UWS guity) high
19 MCS low/high
Zhu et al., 2009 [113] TBI/NTBI 1–2 m 9 MCS visual (emotional picture) high
Qin et al., 2010 [81] TBI/NTBI 2–48 m 11 7 VS/UWS auditory (familiar voice own name) low
4 MCS high
Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2010 [33] TBI 1 m 1 VS/UWS auditory (speech forward/backward) high
Heelman et al., 2010 [41] TBI < 2 m, >6 m 6 6 VS/UWS visual (flash) low
14 m 1 MCS high
Note. N = Number of patients; VS/UWS = vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome; MCS = minimally conscious state; FP =
frontoparietal associative network; TBI = traumatic brain injury; NTBI = non traumatic brain injury; m = months.
response to command inaccessible to clinical bedside
examination.
A multicentric fMRI study enrolling 54 patients in
Cambridge and Lie`ge similarly showed that in 17% of
the cases command following was documented based
on neural activity measurements, in the absence of be-
havioral command following [73]. It should be stressed
that these techniques suffer from a low sensitivity (3%),
meaning that negative results cannot lead to strong con-
clusions as many (minimally) conscious brain dam-
aged patients will fail to show command-related fM-
RI activation. Most interestingly, however, the study
showed that fMRI can be used as a way to communicate
via yes/no questions. Obviously, EEG based alterna-
tives, called brain computer interfaces or BCIs, that are
transportable, cheaper and less sensitive to involuntary
movements should now be tested in DOC patients. In
our view, the medical community, together with ethi-
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Table 4
Current World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases 2011 ICD-9-CM codes for disorders of consciousness and locked-in
syndrome
Diagnosis Code Diagnosis Definition
780.0 Alteration of consciousness None
−780.01 Coma Profound state of unconsciousness associated with depressed cerebral activity
from which the individual cannot be aroused; coma generally occurs when there
is dysfunction or injury involving both cerebral hemispheres or the brain stem.
−780.02 Transient alteration of awareness None
−780.03 Persistent vegetative state None
−780.09 Alteration of consciousness other −Loss of the ability to maintain awareness of self and environment combined
with markedly reduced responsiveness to environmental stimuli.
−The neurologic status characterized by the occurrence of a loss of the ability to
perceive and respond.
− Obtundation, a dulled or reduced level of alertness or consciousness.
344.8 Other specified paralytic syndromes
−344.81 Locked-in state None
Table 5
MEDLINE MeSH Categories for “disorders of consciousness”.
Diseases Category
Nervous System Diseases



















cal and legal scholars [35], needs to prepare the future
clinical use and guidelines defining how to make the
best possible use of these assisted communication tech-
nology in the context of DOC. After we defined when
to trust the measurements, we need to define when to
consider the patient as competent and capable to ex-
press her/his quality of life and to exercise the right of
self-determination.
7. Remaining challenges, appropriate indexing
and future developments
It is clear that our understanding of consciousness
and disorders of consciousness after coma is currently
witnessing a paradigm shift, especially thanks to the re-
sults obtained in functional neuroimaging [51,79]. The
challenge now is to move from single case reports and
small cohort reports to large multi-centric studies fur-
ther addressing the sensitivity and specificity of the dis-
cussed “high-tech” para-clinical neuroimaging or elec-
trophysiological tools. In order to propose validated
evidence based algorithms specifying when and what
investigation needs to be performed in which patient for
diagnostic or prognostic purposes, much more research
efforts and funding are required. Many of the listed
studies were published prior to the formal recognition
of the diagnostic criteria of MCS [36], it can hence not
be formally excluded that some of these patients might
have been minimally conscious. In part of the listed
papers, the clinical distinction between, VS/UWS from
MCS is suboptimal.
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Unfortunately, the World Health Organization does
not yet recognize the minimally conscious state in its
International Statistical Classification of Diseases (9th
Revision, Clinical Modification; ICD-9-CM) diagno-
sis codes and related Current Procedural Terminolo-
gy (CPT) medical procedure codes (maintained by the
American Medical Association). ICD codes classify
symptoms, diseases, or injuries into categories with
unique codes permitting standardized epidemiological,
morbidity and mortality studies, reimbursement and
medical decision-making. The lack of a unique code
for MCS hinders comparison with VS/UWS prevalence
and prognosis and international statistics (Table 4). We
have therefore proposed a 2011 ICD-9-CM Diagnosis
Code 780.04 for the minimally conscious state, defined
as “non-communicative wakeful patients with incon-
sistent but clearly discernible behavioral evidence of
consciousness to be distinguished from comatose, veg-
etative or unresponsive patients by the presence of non-
reflex movements (e.g., eye-tracking or orientation to
pain) or command following”.
Likewise, MEDLINE (i.e., Medical Literature Anal-
ysis and Retrieval System Online compiled by the Unit-
ed States National Library of Medicine and National
Institutes of Health) does not offer a MeSH term (i.e.,
Medical Subject Heading permitting controlled vocab-
ulary for indexing and database searches) for MCS. At
present “MCS” is an entry term included in the MeSH
term “Persistent Vegetative State” (introduced in 1995,
previously indexed under “Coma”). Note that also
locked-in syndrome is not a MeSH entry term whereas
MEDLINE indexed “Akinetic Mutism” in 1971 (Ta-
ble 5).
Undoubtedly, it is an exciting era for the field of brain
injury and disorders of consciousness. The gray zones
between the different clinical entities in the spectrum
following coma are beginning to be better understood
and defined by the increasingly powerful neuroimag-
ing technology. As we have here briefly discussed
a yet to be determined minority of patients who are
currently considered to be “vegetative” or unrespon-
sive, show fMRI or ERP based signs of consciousness
that are inaccessible to clinicians’ motor-response de-
pendent behavioral assessment. These ever improving
technological means are changing the existing clinical
boundaries and will permit some “non-communicative”
and locked-in [19,40,63] patients to correspond their
thoughts and wishes and control their environment via
non-motor pathways. In our view, it would be highly
preferable to soon have a separate ICD-9-CM Diagno-
sis Code and MeSH entry for MCS as the lack of clear
distinction between VS/UWS and MCS may encumber
scientific studies, medical information retrieval, demo-
graphic and international analyses in the rapidly chang-
ing and challenging field of disorders of consciousness.
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